Jonathan Egeland

• Egeland, Jonathan (2024). Mismatch Resistance and the Problem of Evolutionary Novelty. Biological Theory. ISSN 1555-5542. doi: 10.1007/s13752-024-00468-2.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2024). Making sense of the modularity debate. New Ideas in Psychology. ISSN 0732-118X. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2024.101108.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2023). Ariadnetråden i Nietzsches Labyrint: Hvordan finne den «Virkelige Nietzsche». Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943. 58(1), p. 20–30. doi: 10.18261/nft.58.1.3. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  I denne artikkelen argumenterer jeg for at det finnes indre retningslinjer i Nietzsches verk – en ariadnetråd – som viser hvilke av hans ideer og hvilke av hans verk som har eksegetisk fortrinn. Ved å følge disse retningslinjene forklarer jeg hvorfor den «virkelige Nietzsche» er å finne i Zarathustras tale, istedenfor i verkene hvor han formidler med «egen munn». Avslutningsvis sier jeg litt om hva slags filosofi – eller med andre ord, «hvilken Nietzsche» – vi sitter igjen med hvis vi velger å gi Slik Talte Zarathustra eksegetisk fortinn.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2023). Heritability and Etiology: Heritability estimates can provide causally relevant information. Personality and Individual Differences. ISSN 0191-8869. 200. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2022.111896. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Can heritability estimates provide causal information? This paper argues for an affirmative answer: since a non-nil heritability estimate satisfies certain characteristic properties of causation (i.e., association, manipulability, and counterfactual dependence), it increases the probability that the relation between genotypic variance and phenotypic variance is (at least partly) causal. Contrary to earlier proposals in the literature, the argument does not assume the correctness of any particular conception of the nature of causation, rather focusing on properties that are characteristic of causal relationships. The argument is defended against Lewontin's (1974) locality objection and Kaplan and Turkheimer's (2021) recent critique of Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS).

• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Evolutionary Psychology and Normal Science: in Search of a Unifying Research Program. Integrative Psychological and Behavioural Science. ISSN 1932-4502. doi: 10.1007/s12124-022-09736-x. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Why are there so many controversies in evolutionary psychology? Using a couple of concepts from philosophy of science, this paper argues that evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of mature, normal science, since it does not currently have a unifying research program that guides individual scientists working in the discipline. The argument goes against claims made by certain proponents and opponents of evolutionary psychology, and it is supported by discussion of several examples. The paper notes that just because evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of normal science, the discipline is nevertheless a source of many progressive theoretical developments and interesting empirical discoveries.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Theories of Independent Intelligences as a Lakatosian Research Program. Philosophia. ISSN 0048-3893. p. 1–16. doi: 10.1007/s11406-022-00565-1. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). The ups and downs of intelligence: The co-occurrence model and its associated research program. Intelligence. ISSN 0160-2896. 92. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2022.101643. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. 72(4), p. 837–852. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqab074. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Acta Analytica. ISSN 0353-5150. doi: 10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended. logos & episteme an international journal of epistemology. ISSN 2069-3052. doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011434.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600. doi: 10.1017/epi.2018.48.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial Justification. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02604-4.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600. doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.22.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). The demon that makes us go mental: Mentalism defended. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. 176(12), p. 3141–3158. doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1167-7.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological deflationism in the Aftermath of the quine-carnap debate. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 1019-8288. 29(2), p. 33–52.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 1019-8288. 29(2), p. 33–52.

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• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Larry Laudan. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2022). Store norske leksikon. ISSN 0000000000000.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Inklings. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2021). Store norske leksikon. ISSN 0000000000000.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Internalisme og Eksternalisme – Epistemologi. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2021). Store norske leksikon. ISSN 0000000000000.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Debunking Isn't Bunk.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism Distinction.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Against Overconfidence.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Debunking Isn't Bunk.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Accessibilism and Ideal Rationality.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Epistemic Internalism and the Basis of Justification.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2017). Representationalism and the Experience of Pain.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Perspectivism and Interpretation in Nietzsche's Philosophy.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Internalism and the Nature of Justification. Stockholm University.
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Importance of New Technologies for Modern Migrants. United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility.

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