Hofelich has followed the Ph.D. programme in Social Sciences, with specialisation in Public Administration.
- Trial lecture starts at 10:00
- Public defence starts at 12:00
Title of trial lecture: “How does Norway’s affiliation to the EU relate to the notion and analysis of de facto differentiation?”
Disputation chair:
Dean Leif S. Flak
Assessment committee:
- First opponent: Prof. John Erik Fossum (UiO)
- Second opponent: Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zürich)
- Head of committee: Associate professor Anne Elizabeth Stie
Supervisors in the doctoral work:
- Stefan Gänzle, professor at UiA
Summary
Europe à la carte
Integration in the European Union is not uniform. Some member states are allowed to stay outside certain policy areas like the monetary union, while select third states are invited to join, for example, the Schengen zone. Research refers to this as differentiated integration. Typically, these individual rules and exceptions are enshrined in EU law. But sometimes, similar arrangements exist outside of EU law and with or without the permission of Brussels. For example, Sweden’s rejection of the euro is but an informal agreement, Kosovo adopted the euro without the EU’s explicit consent, and governments in Hungary and Poland have partly disabled the EU’s rule of law provisions in their judicial systems. This PhD thesis conceptualises such cases as de facto differentiation and addresses two related research questions:
- What is the role and purpose of de facto differentiation in the EU’s system of differentiated integration?
- What can the EU do to prevent or undo it?
On the basis of three case studies situated in EU fiscal and monetary policy, the thesis concludes that de facto differentiation can be a pragmatic means to accommodate 27 member states with divergent national interests. Its purpose is to make EU integration more flexible when strong demand for differentiation meets the need for discretion or timely action. But if deemed harmful as in the case of rule of law transgressions, the EU’s power to undo de facto differentiation is limited. The coercive power of its enforcement tools varies, conflicts of interest among member states and the institutions may constrain decisive measures, and external shocks can further complicate decision-making.
How to follow online
The defence is open to the public. To follow the trial lecture and the public defence online, please register on Zoom.
We ask online audience members to join no earlier than 10 minutes in advance. After these times, you can leave and rejoin the meeting at any time.
Opponent ex auditorio:
Deadline for the public to pose questions is during the break between the two opponents. Questions ex auditorio can be submitted to Leif Flak.